ABSTRACT. The notion of signification is an important part of Hobbes's philosophy of language. It also has broader relevance, as Hobbes argues that key terms used by his opponents are insignificant. However Hobbes's talk about names' signification is puzzling, as he appears to have advocated conflicting views. This paper argues that Hobbes endorsed two different views of names' signification in two different contexts. When stating his theoretical views about signification, Hobbes claimed that names signify ideas. Elsewhere he talked as if words signified the things they named. Seeing this does not just resolve a puzzle about Hobbes's statements about signification. It also helps us to understand how Hobbes's arguments about insignificant speech work. With one important exception, they depend on the view that names signify things, not on Hobbes's stated theory that words signify ideas.
I use 'idea' where Hobbes uses various terms: 'idea', 'conception', 'phantasm', etc. Though there are distinctions between different sorts of idea Hobbes discusses, he appears not to use the differences in terminology to mark the distinctions in a regular way. For more on Hobbes's treatment of such terms, see W. Sacksteder, "Hobbes: Teaching Philosophy to Speak English", Journal of the History of Philosophy, 16 (1978) , 33-45. 10 Leviathan I.IV, 17. 11 The distinctions between sentences, propositions, and utterances, and Hobbes's views about those distinctions, do not significantly affect the issues in this paper, about names. Alternatively, one might take Hobbes to think that, though sentences are the things that primarily signify, there is a secondary sense in which names signify. One possible such view is this.
(4) The secondary idea signification view. No name signifies per se, as a name is not an act of communication. However, when a name is in a sentence, it contributes the idea to which it is related to the overall signification of the sentence. Thus, the name can be said to signify that idea. 13 There is a range of possible views about the signification of names. By implication, there is a range of possible views about insignificant names. On the object view, a name is insignificant if it names no object. On the idea view (or the secondary idea signification view) an insignificant name would lack an appropriate connection to an idea in the speaker's mind. On the nothing view, all names lack signification, so it is hard to see how any name could be distinctively insignificant.
II. Strategies for investigating the issue
Signification was a notion with a long history. One might hope to to find out what Hobbes thought signification was by seeing what the tradition thought signification was. This sounds promising, but there are good reasons to think it will not work. This introduces names, and the naming relation, but says nothing about signification.
There is no systematic treatment of signification in this chapter, though it is mentioned when Hobbes discusses equivocation.
The appellations that be universal, and common to many things, are not always given to all the particulars, (as they ought to be) for like conceptions and considerations in them all; which is the cause that many of them are not of constant signification, but bring into our minds other thoughts than those for which they were ordained. And these are called EQUIVOCAL. As for example, the word faith sometimes signifieth the same with belief; sometimes it signifieth particularly that belief which maketh a Christian; and sometimes it signifieth the keeping of a promise.
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Here we have a word that can signify beliefs, and can signify actions (such as the keeping of promises). There is also talk of the conceptions involved. But though words are said to be
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EL 5.2-3.
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EL 5.7.
"ordained for" thoughts, and to be "given to" particulars "for" conceptions, they are not said to signify those thoughts or conceptions. So the text suggests the object view of name signification.
Chapter 6 presents a view about the meaning of names: "the truth of a proposition is never evident, until we conceive the meaning of the words or terms whereof it consisteth, which are always conceptions of the mind". 21 That is, words name ideas. That reading is supported by a later passage: "by all names we ought to have some meaning and conception". 22 However, when we look at Hobbes's uses of 'meaning' elsewhere in the Elements of Law, the picture becomes less clear. Consider this from chapter 9: "COURAGE, in a large signification, is the absence of fear in the presence of any evil whatsoever; but in a stricter and more common meaning, it is contempt of wounds and death, when they oppose a man in the way to his end". 23 This is notable because it uses 'meaning' and 'signification'
interchangeably, and also because it embodies an object view of meaning and signification.
The relevant passages in the Elements of Law appear then to be muddled.
IV. Other texts of the 1640s
De Cive lacks a theoretical discussion of signification, but the relevant terms are used. Hobbes says that "all names are imposed to signify our conceptions". 31 This appears to state the idea view rather than the object view. One could try to read it as compatible with the object view, as 'all names are imposed (naming and signifying objects) so that they can be used to make utterances that signify our thoughts', but Hobbes would have chosen a very odd way to say that.
We seem to face a puzzle. Some texts point to 'Emily' signifying Emily and not the idea of Emily, and others to 'Emily' signifying the idea of Emily and not Emily. 
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Leviathan I.V, 13.
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Leviathan I.V, 14-5. Further evidence that Hobbes uses 'signify' in these two ways in these two contexts comes from other parts of Leviathan. 33 Hobbes many times uses 'signify' for a relation between a word and an object or action signified. Consider these examples from the chapters in Part III in which Hobbes looks at the signification of various terms in scripture.
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The word body, in the most general acceptation, signifieth that which filleth or occupieth some certain room or imagined place. Since, as has been defined, names ordered in speech are signs of conceptions, it is obvious that they are not signs of things themselves; for in what sense can the sound of the vocal sound "stone" be understood to be a sign of a stone, other than that whoever might have heard this vocal sound will gather that the speaker has thought of a stone? Therefore the dispute over whether names signify matter, form, or a composite of them and other disputes of this kind are characteristic of erring metaphysicians who do not understand the words about which they are arguing".
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Here we see again the thought that a name alone is not a sign, but can be part of something that is a sign. In the context of that expression, the name is a sort of sign: thus Hobbes's comments about gathering that the speaker has thought of a stone. Hobbes does not here endorse a straightforward idea theory of signification, and there is some sense for him in which names do not signify anything. However, there is a secondary sense in which they do, and that involves a relationship between the name and a thought of the thing named. So we have something like the secondary idea signification view.
VII. Intermediate conclusions
All four readings of Hobbes introduced earlier are right about some passages. Hobbes talks sometimes as if names signify objects (the object view) but at other times as if names signify ideas of those objects (the idea view). In yet other places he says that names alone do not signify (the nothing view) but he also appears to allow a secondary sense in which names do signify (the secondary idea signification view). The key to finding this something other than a muddle is that there is a pattern to which texts each correctly describes. VIII. An "absurdity of speech"
In chapter 11 of the Elements of Law, Hobbes asks what thoughts we have related to certain
words, such as 'God, 'angel', and 'spirit'. 45 The following passage discusses views about souls.
And it is a plain contradiction in natural discourse, to say of the soul of man, that it is tota in toto, and: tota in quadlibet parte corporis, grounded neither upon reason nor revelation; but proceeding from the ignorance of what those things are which are called spectra, images that appear in the dark to children, and such as have strong fears, and other strong imaginations, as hath been said chap. 3, sect. 5, where I call them phantasms. For taking them to be things really without us, like bodies, and seeing them to come and vanish as 43 EW 4.303-4. 44 One might propose unifying these two aspects of Hobbes's talk about signification by attributing to him a Lockean view, on which words primarily and immediately signify ideas, but secondarily and mediately signify things. However, there is no sign of the distinction between immediate and mediate signification in Hobbes's texts. 45 One might take this project to suggest an idea theory of signification, but Hobbes does not make the connection, and thoughts can be related to names without being signified by them. strangely as they do, unlike to bodies; what could they call them else, but incorporeal bodies? which is not a name, but an absurdity of speech.
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The problem arises, Hobbes says, from mistaken beliefs about spectra: believing them to be external things rather than thoughts. If you believe that, says Hobbes, then you must believe that these things resemble bodies in some ways (existing outside and independently of us) but not others (popping in and out of existence, or at least moving in odd discontinuous ways). Those beliefs, Hobbes further suggests, push one to the position in which the sensible name to give these things is 'incorporeal bodies': 'bodies' for their independent external existence, and 'incorporeal' for their weird behaviour, totally unlike bodies in other respects.
And 'incorporeal body', as Hobbes concludes, is an absurd thing to call anything. This is reminiscent of the argument from Leviathan 4 with which I began the paper, but is not, as we will see, really the same. Note though that the problems with the name are secondary. They are important for Hobbes because they are symptomatic of another problem, believing spectra to be like and unlike bodies, which is itself a sign of the basic problem, thinking them to be independently existing things rather than thoughts. The criticism is ultimately expressed as about language, but the linguistic problem is derivative of a more basic one.
IX. "All other names are but insignificant sounds"
Returning to the argument in Leviathan 4, we have this.
All other names are but insignificant sounds; and those of two sorts. One when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by definition;
whereof there have been abundance coined by schoolmen, and puzzled philosophers.
Another, when men make a name of two names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent, as this name, an incorporeal body, or (which is all one) an incorporeal substance, and a great number more. For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signify nothing at all. 
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Here is an argument for the insignificance of certain names: if 'Some S is P' is false, then 'PS' is an insignificant name. 'A quadrangle is round' is false, so 'round quadrangle' is insignificant. 'Virtue is in-blown' is false so 'in-blown virtue' is insignificant. Similarly, says
Hobbes, 'a body is incorporeal' and 'a substance is incorporeal' are false, so 'incorporeal body' and 'incorporeal substance' are insignificant. Taking Hobbes to be using 'signify' he usually does, following an object theory, this all adds up nicely. If 'Some S is P' is false, then there is no thing that is named by both 'S' and 'P'. So the compound name 'PS' will name no object. Because Hobbes uses 'signifies' for 'names', it signifies no object. That is, it's insignificant.
Descriptions such as 'senseless' and 'absurd' might suggest there is more wrong with these terms than their merely naming no actual thing. Consider 'winged horse', which names no actual thing: 'some horse is winged' is false. The name appears not to be completely senseless though. But in Hobbes's terms it is, unless perhaps it signifies the imagined figure of a winged horse. 48 This is confirmed by a passage in the next chapter: "But when we reason in words of general signification, and fall upon a general inference which is false, though it be commonly called error, it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or senseless Speech". 49 Hobbes here confirms that some things others call false, he calls absurd and senseless.
The argument in chapter 4 is supplemented by one in chapter 34. Hobbes us what 'body' signifies -"that which filleth or occupieth some certain room or imagined place, and dependeth not on the imagination, but is a real part of that we call the universe" -and what 'substance' signifies -"The same also, because bodies are subject to change … is called substance (that is to say, subject to various accidents), as: sometimes to be moved, sometimes to stand still [etc]". He then offers an argument against 'incorporeal substance':
"according to this acceptation of the word, substance and body signify the same thing; and 47 Leviathan I.IV, 17. 48 Though the objects named by names are not always ideas, they can be ideas. The name 'my idea of Emily' names an idea of a cat, not a cat. 49 Leviathan I.V, 19. therefore substance incorporeal are words which, when they are joined together, destroy one another, as if a man should say, an incorporeal body". 50 Hobbes's argument appears to be the following.
(1) 'Body' and 'substance' signify the same thing. So (2) 'incorporeal substance' is equivalent to 'incorporeal body'. But (3) 'incorporeal body' is unacceptable. So (4) 'incorporeal substance' is unacceptable. The use of 'signify the same thing' looks to be another case of Hobbes's use of 'signify' as if he believed in an object theory. Then however the move from (1) to (2) looks questionable, because it relies on two names being substitutable because of their extensional equivalence alone. 51 That is not obviously a good 
X. Leviathan 5
But when we make a general assertion, unless it be a true one, the possibility of it is inconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound 50 Leviathan III.XXXIV, 207. 51 Hobbes sees non-extensional differences between the terms, as they are applied to the same stuff for different reasons. 'Body' is applied when we're thinking of it as mindindependent extended stuff, 'substance' when we're thinking of it as the subject of accidents. 52 As I discuss below, one might well suspect that some of Hobbes's arguments are circular: that he argues for instance from the truth of materialism to the insignificance of 'immaterial substance' to the truth of materialism.
are those we call absurd, insignificant, and nonsense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a round quadrangle, or accidents of bread in cheese; or immaterial substances, or of a free subject; a free will, or any free, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in an error; but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, absurd.
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Here names are said to be insignificant when an appropriate conception is absent. 'Round quadrangle' is insignificant because there is no accompanying idea of a round quadrangle.
Thus Hobbes here relies on an idea theory of name signification. 54 Goodness knows why an idea theory is employed here all of a sudden. However, having seen that Hobbes in general seems happy to employ two conflicting theories of name signification, it becomes less surprising than it would otherwise be that there should be two different views of signification involved in passages about insignificant names. This reduces the pressure to twist this passage to fit into the same framework as the two discussed above: it just does not, because
Hobbes was inconsistent in how he spoke about the signification of names. 55 There is a pattern to Hobbes's inconsistencies, but that doesn't make them consistent or justified. 54 One might say the same about the discussion in Leviathan I.VIII of "words without anything correspondent to them in the mind". However, that discussion is about "when men speak such words as, put together, have in them no signification at all", but not about compound names, and thus appears to be about insignificant sentences, not insignificant names. 55 In Leviathan I.IV we see another argument about language that's problematic because of the absence of certain conceptions, concluding that "of absurd and false affirmations, in case they be universal, there can be no understanding" (Leviathan I.IV, 17) . But that is a passage about knowledge and understanding, not signification and meaning. Unlike the passage in the following chapter, it does not conclude that the name is insignificant because of the absence of conception. Plausibly this is because the absence is in the hearer, not the speaker. 56 This passage does not fit the pattern I described earlier, of Hobbes talking as if he held an idea theory only when explicitly stating that theory. I believe I must simply admit this is evidence against my claim, but it is only one passage that does not fit the pattern.
understand Hobbes's argument in this way, then again we must say that it will not persuade his opponents.
The example of "accidents of bread in cheese" concerns the possibility of one instance of an accident inhering first in one object, then in another. Hobbes elsewhere argues against those he thinks have a mistaken conception of accidents. 57 In Leviathan I.V, Hobbes focuses on the idea that accidents can exist without the substances to which they usually belong. There are philosophers who think that accidents can sometimes exist apart from substances: those who believe that in transubstantiation the substances of the bread and wine are eliminated, and the accidents that before inhere in those substances afterwards either exist without inhering in anything, or inhere only in extended quantity, not in substance. Hobbes criticizes transubstantiation, and we might take his criticism of those who believe accidents to be parts to be directed at those who believe in transubstantiation, or at least at those who explain it by saying that accidents, like parts, do not have to continue to be connected to the substances they are connected to. 58 Hobbes argues that that we should not treat accidents as language is used in theories that involve (non-compatibilist) free will: "the defending of this opinion hath drawn the Bishop and other patrons of it into many inconvenient and absurd conclusions, and made them make use of an infinite number of insignificant words". 61 Hobbes argues that 'rational will' is insignificant -unless it means "a will after deliberation, whether he that deliberateth reasoneth right or not" -as are 'necessary effects' -unless it means "such effects as shall necessarily be produced" -'free cause', and 'determining themselves'. 62 Hobbes's talk about insignificance in the Questions tends to be in the parts written in the 1650s, rather than in the parts that reproduce texts from his debate with themselves' added at the end. 63 The discussion in which 'rational will' is said to be insignificant is structured in the same way. 64 The claim about the insignificance of 'necessary effects' comes at the start not the end of the passage it occurs in, but is again not the focus of the discussion. My reading has something common with Engel's discussion of the " Table of Absurdity" in De Corpore . 66 In that table, Hobbes classifies certain sorts of sentences as absurd. It summarizes his view that "copulated names do not cohere in seven ways". 67 being used to support the claims of absurdity. This leads him to much the same worry about circularity that I had above. 70 Engel's resolution of the lies in thinking that Hobbes's fundamental aim was not really to show something about language and absurdity. The talk about language and absurdity is rather an attempt to support some philosophical theses (not about language).
[W]hat Hobbes really wished to do was not to prove some new thesis about language, but rather to lend added strength to a position already established by subsuming it under some general logical linguistic scheme. For Hobbes's line of argument does not proceed from language to the body of his philosophy, but from the body of his philosophy to certain facts about language which tend, he thinks, to lend support to that body. The ultimate appeal is philosophical, not linguistic. Hobbes is not in such cases subsuming his views under a "linguistic scheme". He is bringing a wide variety of criticisms together as instances of the criticism of others' insignificant speech. There is no unifying theory, but a unifying critical line. Criticisms of views about the nature of the mind, about free will, and about transubstantiation are all brought together, having in common that there is insignificant speech involved. Being able to unify his criticisms in this way helps Hobbes. He can produce lists of insignificant terms his opponents use, creating the appearance of a repeated mistake, despite the reasons for the insignificance of each term being different. Presenting these all as problems about signification allows for a thematic connection to other criticisms of language. Hobbes 70 Engel, "Hobbes's Table of Absurdity", 542. 71 Engel, "Hobbes's Table of Absurdity", 542.
